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STANDING AND ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION:
SIERRA CLUB v. MORTON1
In Sierra Club v. Morton,2 the United States Supreme Court for the
first time directly considered the issue of standing for an environ-
mental protection group.3  Previously many of the lower federal
courts had become progressively more liberal in granting standing to
sue to groups seeking to prevent environmental injury4 and other "in-
1. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
2. Id.
3. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), an
environmental protection group was a party to an action brought under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (1970), but the issue of standing was not
raised. 405 U.S. at 734 n.7.
4. See, e.g., West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441
F.2d 232, 235 (4th Cir. 1971) (standing to challenge the administration of the
Monongahela National Forest granted to a non-profit membership corporation dedi-
cated to preserving natural, scenic and historic areas in the West Virginia highlands);
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. HEW, 428 F.2d 1083, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(environmental organization seeking "to assure the preservation or restoration of en-
vironmental quality on behalf of the general public" had standing to review a decision
of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare refusing to establish a "zero toler-
ance" for DDT residues in or on raw agricultural commodities); Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093, 1096-97 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (same or-
ganization, alleging a devotion to environmental protection, accorded standing to
review a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture refusing to cancel the registration for
DDT); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 102-05 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970) (environmental organizations, "as responsible
representatives of the public," were granted standing to seek a declaration that the
issuance of a permit authorizing the construction of an expressway was beyond the
scope of the issuing agency's authority); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 615-16 (2d Cir. 1965) (conservationist organization, requesting
that orders of the FPC granting a license to construct a power plant be set aside, was
afforded standing because it had "exhibited a special interest" in the aesthetic, conser-
vational, and recreational aspects of power development); Cape May County Chapter,
Inc., Izaak Walton League v. Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504, 509-13 (D.N.J. 1971) (en-
vironmental and conservation organization was accorded standing to seek a declara-
tory judgment and injunctive relief respecting the preservation and protection of
marine related resources because it was a local chapter of a renowned environmental
group that would "resolutely press forward" in the action); Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans,
328 F. Supp. 332, 333-34 (D.N.M. 1971) (environmental association whose stated pur-
pose was "to preserve and improve the quality of the environment in the Upper Pecos
Valley" was given standing to challenge the granting of funds by the Economic De-
velopment Administration for a road project in northern New Mexico); Honchok v.
Hardin, 326 F. Supp. 988, 989 n.1, 991 (D. Md. 1971) (individuals and a conserva-
tion organization alleging an interest in the preservation of a "viable habitat and en-
vironment" were accorded standing to seek a declaratory judgment and an injunction
prohibiting the Secretary of Agriculture from permitting mining operations in a na-
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commercial-recreational area in the valley.10 The proposal of Walt
Disney Enterprises, Inc. was accepted and Disney was accorded a three
year permit to conduct surveys and explorations in the valley in further-
ance of its preparation of a complete master plan for the resort."
The master plan, submitted by Disney and approved by the Forest
Service in January, 1969, provided for an expenditure of $35 million
on the construction of a complex of motels, restaurants, swimming
pools, parking lots and other structures designed to accommodate
14,000 visitors daily.'" The complex was to occupy 80 acres of the
valley pursuant to a 30 year use permit issued by the Forest Service.'"
A revocable special use permit was to be issued allowing other facilities,
including ski lifts, ski trails, a cog-assisted railway, and utility installa-
tions, to be erected on the mountain slopes and other areas of the
valley.' 4  Access to the resort was to be provided by a highway
20 miles in length to be constructed by the state of California, a sec-
tion of which would have traversed Sequoia National Park." Also
crossing the park would have been a high power line needed to supply the
resort with electricity.' Both the highway and the power line required
the approbation of the Department of Interior.'
7
The Sierra Club, distraught with the prospect of so vast a develop-
ment of the wilderness area, unsuccessfully sought a public hearing on
the matter in 1965.8 In June, 1969, the club instituted an action in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of California,
requesting a declaratory judgment that the proposed development con-
10. 405 U.S. at 729.
11. Id. The authority to issue such permits is provided by 16 U.S.C. § 497
(1970).
12. 405 U.S. at 729. This represents an expenditure of over 10 times that antici-
pated by the Forest Service. In general the Disney complex was gargantuan compared
to the anticipations of the Forest Service when issuing its prospectus. Id. at 743-44 n.5
(Douglas, J., dissenting); Petitioner's Brief, supra note 8, at 9-10.
13. 405 U.S. at 729.
14. Id.
15. Id. This road was subsequently deleted from the California state highway sys-
tem. Ch. 1051, § 1, [1972] 6 West's Cal. Legis. Serv. 2108, amending CAL. STR. &
H. CODE ANN. § 576 (West 1969). This action will apparently result in the main-
taining of the existing secondary road and the inability of the developer to gain the
necessary access to the Mineral King area for the large number of expected users.
16. 405 U.S. at 729.
17. The authority to approve the construction of power lines and roads in national
parks is vested in the Department of Interior by 16 U.S.C. §§ 5, 8 (1970). However,
the Sierra Club contended that a permit for construction of a power line could not be
issued without specific congressional authorization. See note 19 infra.
18. 405 U.S. at 730.
[Vol. 6
1973] NOTES
juries of a non-economic nature to interests that are widely shared."
The Sierra Club Court, however, in a 4-3 decision written by Justice
Stewart and joined in by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Marshall
and White, put a halt to the liberalizing trend in the lower courts by
denying the Sierra Club, a conservation organization, standing to
maintain a suit for a declaratory judgment and an injunction restraining
federal officials from approving an immense recreational development
in the Mineral King Valley in the Sequoia National Forest.
7
The Mineral King Valley, an area of profound natural beauty lo-
cated in the Sierra Nevada Mountains of northern California, is a
semi-wilderness region used almost exclusively for recreational pur-
poses." Because the valley is part of the Sequoia National Forest, its
supervision is administered by the United States Forest Service." In
1965 the Forest Service published a prospectus, inviting bids from
private developers for the construction and operation of a year round
tional forest); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp.
728, 733-36 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (environmental organization granted standing to oppose
the construction of a dam even though the organization had "no direct private and per-
sonal economic interest" in the river involved); Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair,
313 F. Supp. 1312, 1316-17 (D. Minn. 1970) (environmental and conservational or-
ganization afforded standing to seek a declaratory judgment and an order enjoining
certain mining operations in the Boundary Waters Canoe Area because its interest
in the wilderness movement was "continuing, basic and deep").
5. 405 U.S. at 734. Injuries to public health, safety, aesthetics and convenience have
often been referred to as "public nuisances" in state actions. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF
TORTS 583-85 (4th ed. 1971). However, the expression has not been applied in federal
cases, since the suits are either brought under a federal statute or on constitutional
grounds. In state tort actions, absent statutory authorization, neither private indi-
viduals nor groups are allowed standing to protest public nuisances absent some type of
injury different in kind from that caused to the public at large. Id. at 586-87. See
note 107 infra.
6. Justices Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
7. 405 U.S. at 730, 741.
8. Id. at 728. In its proposal for development of the area Walt Disney Productions
described the Mineral King Valley as follows:
Unsurpassed in natural splendor, Mineral King is perhaps more similar to the
European Alps than any other area in the United States. Altitudes range from
7,800 foot valley to surrounding mountains that reach the 12,400 foot level.
The High Sierra wonderland, located in Sequoia National Forest, is generously
endowed with lakes, streams, cascades, caverns and matchless mountain vistas.
Brief for Petitioner at 7, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Petitioner's Brief].
9. The Forest Reserve Act of 1897, ch. 2, § 1, 30 Stat. 35, as amended, 16 U.S.C.
§ 551 (1970), imposed upon the Secretary of Interior the duty to preserve the national
forests. This duty was transferred to the Forest Service, created within the Department
of Agriculture, by the Act of Feb. 1, 1905, ch. 288, § 1, 33 Stat. 628, as amended,
16 U.S.C. § 472 (1970).
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travened federal laws and regulations governing conservation of na-
tional parks and forests 9 and seeking preliminary and permanent injunc-
tions restraining the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agricul-
ture, and various other federal officials from granting their approval or
issuing necessary permits. 20  The Sierra Club sued as a membership
corporation alleging injury to its aesthetic, conservational, and recrea-
tional interests,2" invoking the judicial review provisions of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act.22  The club claimed standing to sue be-
cause of its "special interest in conservation and in the maintenance of
the national parks, game refuges and forests of the country. '2 3  The
district court rejected the respondents' challenge to the Sierra Club's
standing to sue and, finding that there was a threat of irreparable injury,
granted a preliminary injunction pending a resolution of the case on
the merits.24
In response to the Government's appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reversed. 2' The court of appeals disagreed with the
19. The Sierra Club alleged (1) that the special-use permit allowing construction of
the resort in authorizing use of 13,000 acres violated the maximum acreage restriction
placed upon it by 16 U.S.C. § 497 (1970) and that the Forest Service had no author-
ity to issue a revocable use permit; (2) that granting of the proposed permit for the
highway through Sequoia National Park would violate 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1970), authoriz-
ing the Secretary of the Interior "to promote and regulate the use" of national parks
and "to grant privileges, leases, and permits for the use of the land" in the parks, in
that it would not serve any of the purposes of the park, as well as violate 17 U.S.C.
H9 41, 43 (1970), in that it would destroy timber and other natural resources pro-
tected by 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); (3) that by failing to hold adequate public hearings on
the proposed project, the Forest Service and the Department of Interior had violated
their own regulations; and (4) that 16 U.S.C. § 45c (1970) required congressional
authorization for the issuance of a permit to erect a power transmission line within a
national park. Id. at 730 n.2.
20. Id. at 730.
21. The Club alleged no unique material interest. Indeed, in a brief filed with the
United States Supreme Court, it asserted:
Under the decisions of this Court, a litigant need not, and therefore should not,
resort to artifice by alleging injury to an inconsequential but unique material inter-
est when injury to the litigant's aesthetic, conservational or recreational interest is
the real reason for the lawsuit.
The Government seeks to create a "heads I win, tails you lose" situation in
which either the courthouse door is barred for lack of assertion of a private, unique
injury or a preliminary injunction is denied on the ground that the litigant has
advanced private injury which does not warrant an injunction adverse to a com-
peting public interest. Counsel have shaped their case to avoid this trap. Reply
Brief for Petitioner at 6, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Petitioner's Reply Brief].
22. 5 U.S.C. H 701-06 (1970).
23. 405 U.S. at 730.
24. Id. at 731. The district court opinion is not reported.
25. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1970).
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district court's accordance of standing to the Sierra Club, finding that
"[t]here is no allegation in the complaint that members of the Sierra
Club would be affected by the actions of defendants-appellants other
than the fact that the actions are personally displeasing or distasteful
to them."2 6 The court then remarked:
We do not believe such club concern without a showing of more direct
interest can constitute standing in the legal sense sufficient to challenge
the exercise of responsibilities on behalf of all of the citizens by two
cabinet level officials of the government acting under Congressional and
Constitutional authority.
27
As an alternative holding, the court of appeals found the Sierra Club
had not made an adequate showing of irreparable injury and probable
success on the merits28 and vacated the preliminary injunction granted
by the district court.29
Upon petition of the Sierra Club, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari." Speaking for the majority of the Court, Justice
Stewart held the Sierra Club's allegations that it had "exhibited a spe-
cial interest in the conservation and the sound maintenance of the na-
tional parks, game refuges and forests of the country,""1 that one of its
principal purposes was "to protect and conserve the national resources
of the Sierra Nevada Mountains," 2 and that its interests would be ag-
grieved by the administrative acts of the defendants failed to disclose
an injury sufficiently direct to grant it standing to seek judicial review of
those acts. 3 The majority maintained that a party seeking judicial re-
view under the Administrative Procedure Act must have suffered a
direct injury to itself, economic or otherwise, and that a mere organi-
zational interest in a problem was not sufficient to confer standing
under the act.34 Since the Sierra Club had alleged only an organiza-
26. Id. at 33.
27. Id. at 30. In his concurring opinion, Judge Hamley agreed with the majority
that the district court's granting of the preliminary injunction amounted to an abuse of
discretion. However, he disagreed with the majority's denial of standing, saying:
The Sierra Club represents thousands of members who have a deep interest in
aesthetic, conservational and recreational values of a kind intended to be safe-
guarded by the statutes in question, and the regulations and practices thereunder.
: . [I]t seems to me the Sierra Club members may assert that a legal wrong
is being inflicted upon them-a wrong which their chosen organization has standing
to resist in this lawsuit. Id. at 38.
28. Id. at 37.
29. Id. at 38.
30. 401 U.S. 907 (1971).
31. 405 U.S. at 735 n.8.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 734-35, 741.
34. Id. at 738-39.
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tional interest in the area of environmental protection, it was denied
standing to sue." The majority intimated no view on the merits of
the case.
30
Justices Blackmun, Brennan and Douglas dissented. Justice Black-
mun decried the rigidity and inflexibility of the majority's opinion and
urged reversal of the judgment of the court of appeals and approval of
the district court's judgment on the condition that the Sierra Club
amend its complaint to meet the majority's standing requirements.r
Alternatively, Justice Blackmun proposed an expansion of the tradi-
tional concepts of standing. This proposal would confer standing to
litigate environmental issues upon an organization with well recognized
attributes and purposes in the environmental area.3 8 Justice Brennan,
in an extremely brief dissent, merely noted his agreement with Justice
Blackmun's alternative proposal and indicated a desire to reach the
merits, which he considered to be substantial. a9 Justice Douglas,
while indicating agreement with Justice Blackmun's views, argued that
the best approach would be to fashion a federal rule allowing environ-
mental issues to be litigated before federal courts in the name of the
inanimate object about to be despoiled.40 This would not be signifi-
cantly different, Justice Douglas reasoned, than customary judicial ap-
pointments of guardians ad litem, executors, conservators, receivers,
or counsel for indigents. 41
The sole question considered by the Court in Sierra Club was
whether the Sierra Club had alleged facts entitling it to judicial review
of the challenged administrative action.4" The Sierra Club relied on
section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, which provides that:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.43
Prior to the enactment of legislation providing for judicial review,
the courts were very reluctant to grant standing to protest federal
agency action. For example, in Tennessee Electric Power Co. v.
35. Id. at 739-41.
36. Id. at 741.
37. Id. at 755-57.
38. Id. at 757.
39. Id. at 755.
40. Id. at 741.
41. Id. at 750 n.8.
42. Id. at 731.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
1973]
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TVA,44 a private electric company was denied standing to sue to enjoin
competition by the Tennessee Valley Authority even though a serious
financial injury was threatened. The Court explained that no "legal
right" was being invaded by the agency action, a legal right being de-
fined as "one of property, one arising out of contract . . . or one
founded on a statute which confers a privilege.
' '45
The early decisions reflected the Court's tendency to leave the regu-
lation of federal agencies entirely in the hands of the legislature. The
critical need for legislation providing for judicial review of agency ac-
tion and Congress' recognition of this need was apparent from the 1937
Report of President's Committee on Administrative Management, which
was considered in the House of Representatives during the debates on
the Administrative Procedure Act. 6 The Report noted:
There is a conflict of principle involved in their [the agencies']
make-up and functions. . . . They are vested with duties of adminis-
tration . . . and at the same time they are given important judicial
work. . . . The evils resulting from this confusion of principles are in-
sidious and far reaching. . . . Pressures and influences properly
enough directed toward officers responsible for formulating and admin-
istering policy constitute an unwholesome atmosphere in which to ad-
judicate private rights. But the mixed duties of the commissions render
escape from these subversive influences impossible.
47
As a result of such considerations, Congress in 1946 enacted the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, including the judicial review provision re-
lied upon by the Sierra Club in the instant case.48
Unfortunately, the crucial terms "legal wrong", "adversely affected",
and "aggrieved" were left undefined in the act, and early cases under
the act continued to utilize the strict "legal interest" approach. For
example, in Kansas City Power and Light Co. v. McKay,4 9 wherein
44. 306 U.S. 118 (1939); accord, Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479
(1938), wherein the Court held that a private electric company did not have standing
to protest the loaning of money by the U.S. government to municipalities in competi-
tion with the private company because no "legal injury" was threatened.
45. 306 U.S. at 137-38.
46. HousE COmm. ON THE JUDICIARY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVI
PROCEDUrE AcT, H.R. Doc. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1195 (1946).
47. Id.
48. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). Some regulatory acts in addition to the Administrative
Procedure Act which include general standing provisions for persons "aggrieved" are
the Federal Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1970), the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1970), and the Federal Power Act, 16
U.S.C. § 825 (1970).
49. 225 F.2d 924 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955).
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a private electric company sought to enjoin federal officers and agen-
cies from carrying out a federally supported power program which
threatened to compete with its business, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals held that such economic injury would not qualify the com-
pany as an aggrieved party under the Administrative Procedure Act
because no "legal rights" were being invaded.5° The court, reasoning
in a circle, explained that a "legal wrong" is "such wrong as particular
statutes and the courts have recognized as constituting grounds for
judicial review. '51
In recent cases, however, the courts have taken a more liberal ap-
proach toward judicial review of agency action. In Hardin v. Ken-
tucky Utilities Co.,52 a private utility company sought to enjoin the
Tennessee Valley Authority from competing with its business. The
Court held that the utility's business interest was a legally protected
one because the relevant regulatory statute, the Tennessee Valley Au-
thority Act,53 was designed to protect private utilities from competi-
tion. 54  The Court allowed standing under "familiar judicial princi-
ples," finding that the use of a specific statute providing for judicial
review was unnecessary. 5
Finally, in Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,
Inc. v. Camp50 and Barlow v. Collins,5 7 both decided on the same
day in 1970, the Court eliminated the need for showing that a legal
right was being invaded or that the legislative intent of a regulatory
statute was to allow standing to a particular class of persons. The
plaintiffs in Data Processing, relying upon the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, protested a ruling by the Comptroller of the Currency that
permitted national banks to make their data processing equipment avail-
able to other banks and to bank customers, alleging that such competi-
tion from national banks would result in loss of profits to the data
50. Id. at 932.
51. Id. Professor Davis points out that "[c]ircular reasoning is very common,
for one of the questions asked in order to determine whether a plaintiff has standing is
whether the plaintiff has a legal right, but the question whether the plaintiff has a legal
right is the final conclusion, for if the plaintiff has standing his interest is a legally-
protected interest, and that is what is meant by a legal right." 3 K. DAvis, ADmns-
mnv LAw TREATISE 217 (1958).
52. 390 U.S. 1 (1968).
53. 16 U.S.C. § 831 et seq. (1970).
54. 390 U.S. at 7, relying on section 15d(a) of the Tennessee Valley Authority
Act, 73 Stat. 280, as amended, 16 U.S.C. § 831n-4(a) (1970).
55. 390 U.S. at 7.
56. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
57. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
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processing industry. 58  The plaintiffs in Barlow were tenant farmers
who claimed that the Secretary of Agriculture had improperly adopted
certain regulations which left them economically at the mercy of their
landlords. 9 Noting that the question of whether a legal right had
been invaded was applicable to the merits of the case rather than to
the question of standing,"0 the Court in Data Processing adopted a
new two-step approach to standing, holding first that a plaintiff would
have to meet the constitutional "case or controversy" requirement 1 by
alleging "that the challenged action had caused him injury in fact,
economic or otherwise," 2 and second that the plaintiff's interests must
be "arguably within the zone of the interests to be protected or regu-
lated by the statute . . . in question." 3  The Court noted that the
second part of the test was merely a restatement of the Administrative
Procedure Act's grant of power to sue to persons "aggrieved" by
action under some "relevant statute,""4 and the plaintiffs in both Bar-
low and Data Processing were granted standing to sue.05
Although the injuries in both Data Processing and Barlow were
economic ones, the Court in Data Processing had noted that the in-
terest which the plaintiff is seeking to protect "may reflect 'aesthetic,
conservational, and recreational' as well as economic values."00  In
view of the new test established by Data Processing and Barlow, the
Sierra Club Court had to determine whether the Sierra Club had al-
leged injury sufficient to qualify as "injury in fact." The injury al-
leged by the Club was to its aesthetic, conservational, and recreational
interests. 67  This injury would be incurred by reason of the change in
the uses to which the Mineral King Valley would be put and the con-
comitant change in the aesthetics and the ecology of the area. In
58. 397 U.S. at 151-52.
59. 397 U.S. at 162-63.
60. 397 U.S. at 153.
61. U.S. CONST. art. M, § 2. The Data Processing Court noted that "'[Iln
terms of Article III limitations . . . the question of standing is related only to whether
the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context . . ."
397 U.S. at 151-52, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968).
62. 397 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 153.
64. Id. The Sierra Club took the position that the preservation of the Sierra Nevada
Mountains was the object of several statutes specifically relating to Sequoia National
Park and the Sequoia National Game Refuge, and that the preservation of the national
parks, forests, and game refuges in general was the object of various other federal
statutes. See note 19 supra.
65. 397 U.S. at 158; 397 U.S. at 164.
66. 397 U.S. at 154, quoting Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 354
F.2d 608, 616 (2d Cir. 1965).
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acknowledging that such injury may qualify as "injury in fact," the
Court said:
We do not question that this type of harm may amount to an "injury in
fact" sufficient to lay the basis for standing under § 10 of the APA
[Administrative Procedure Act]. Aesthetic and environmental well-
being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the quality
of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental interests
are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less
deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.68
The Court noted, however, that the only parties actually harmed by
the injury to the Mineral King Valley were those who used the area. 69
The Sierra Club, rather than allege that its activities or the activities
of its members would be affected by the development of Mineral
King,70 or that its members used Mineral King,71 relied solely upon
the theory that the suit was a "public" action involving environmental
questions and, as such, the Club's longstanding concern and expertise
in this area should give it standing as a "representative of the public. ' 7
The Court refused to adopt such an approach: "[Tihe 'injury in fact'
test requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires
that the party seeking review be himself among the injured."7
67. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
68. 405 U.S. at 734. This language indicates a departure from the more restrictive
view of harm or injury expounded in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923),
wherein the Court held that a federal taxpayer lacked standing under the case or con-
troversy requirement, U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, to challenge the legality of a federal ex-
penditure because the taxpayer's interest was "shared with millions of others" and was
"comparatively minute and indeterminable." Id. at 487. In order to have standing,
the Court required the challenger to show "that he has sustained or is immediately in
danger of sustaining some direct injury . . . and not merely that he suffers in some
indefinite way in common with people generally." Id. at 488. Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968), later held that taxpayers have standing to challenge the constitu-
tionality of federal expenditures by showing "that the challenged enactment exceeds
specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the congressional taxing
and spending power . . . ." Id. at 102-03. The Flast case is symptomatic of the
recent trend in the federal courts toward recognition of injury to definite interests, even
if minute, unquantifiable or widely shared, as being sufficient for standing purposes.
See W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 587 n.68 (4th ed. 1971); K. DAvIs, ADMINISTRA-
TivE LAw TREATiSE § 22.09-5 (Supp. 1970); note 4 supra.
69. 405 U.S. at 735.
70. Id.
71. In an amici curiae brief filed by the Wilderness Society and others it was stated
that the Sierra Club sponsored pack trips originating at Mineral King. However, the
Sierra Club refused to rely upon this activity for standing purposes. Petitioner's Re-
ply Brief, supra note 21, at 6.
72. 405 U.S. at 736, quoting Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425
F.2d 97, 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
73. 405 U.S. at 734-35.
19733
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
Certain lower court decisions had shown a propensity to liberalize
the law of standing to sue and had conferred standing upon parties as
"representatives of the public. '7 4  Two exemplary cases are Scenic
Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC75 and Office of Communica-
tion of the United Church of Christ v. FCC."
In Scenic Hudson, conservationist organizations and three local
towns asked the court to set aside orders of the FPC granting a license
to Consolidated Edison to build a power plant on the Hudson River.
77
The court granted standing to each of the plaintiffs and said:
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will ade-
quately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and
recreational aspects of power development, those who by their activities
and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such areas, must be
held to be included in the class of "aggrieved" parties .... 78
Although not an environmental law action, United Church of Christ
parallels Scenic Hudson on the standing issue. The plaintiffs in United
Church of Christ charged television station WLBT with discriminatory
programming. They filed with the FCC a timely petition to intervene
in a license renewal proceeding in order to present evidence and argu-
ments opposing the station's renewal application."0 The Commission
dismissed the petition and, without a hearing, granted a restricted and
conditional renewal of the license.8 0 The Court of Appeals for the
74. See, e.g., cases cited in note 4 supra. However, the Ninth Circuit has consis-
tently resisted such a tendency. In Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California, 437
F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1971), the court of appeals held that the Association, which was
formed for the protection of the public interest in the waters of the San Francisco
Bay, did not have standing in behalf of its members to protest certain land fill opera-
tions that would contract the outline of the Bay because it failed to allege injury to
itself. Four of the individual members of the Association, who sued in their own behalf
for threatened property damage, were allowed standing. The court refused to recog-
nize that the relationship between the organization and its members was sufficient to
allow the Association to sue on their behalf. Id. at 1091. See text accompanying
notes 159-60 infra.
Of interest in its application to the Sierra Club case is the court's comment, "If the
Association here had a recreational operation which it conducted and which the de-
fendants interfered with, it could assert it . . .or if it operated a conservation pro-
gram, an interference with that operation would establish standing." 437 F.2d at 1091.
75. 354 F.2d 608 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
76. 359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
77. 354 F.2d at 611.
78. Id. at 616.
79. 359 F.2d at 997. The Federal Power Act, similar to the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, grants standing to "[any party . . . aggrieved." 16 U.S.C. § 8251(b)
(1970).
80. 359 F.2d at 997.
NOTES
District of Columbia Circuit, in an opinion written by then Judge War-
ren Burger, reversed, holding that, "[i]n order to safeguard the public
interest in broadcasting . . . some 'audience participation' must be al-
lowed in license renewal proceedings."''8 The plaintiffs, as spokesmen
for the listening public, were held to have standing.1
2
The Sierra Club itself had successfully obtained standing as a "repre-
sentative of the public interest" prior to the instant case. In Citizens
Committee for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe,8 the plaintiffs, including
the Sierra Club, sought a declaratory judgment and an injunction to
prevent the issuance by the Army Corps of Engineers of a permit au-
thorizing a dredge and fill operation for the construction of a portion
of the Hudson River Expressway.8 4 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, relying on Scenic Hudson and United Church of Christ,
held that the plaintiffs had standing as responsible representatives of
the public interest in environmental resources:
We hold, therefore, that the public interest in environmental resources
-an interest created by statutes affecting the issuance of this permit-
is a legally protected interest affording these plaintiffs, as responsible
representatives of the public, standing to obtain judicial review of
agency action alleged to be in contravention of that public interest.
85
The court reasoned that the plaintiffs had demonstrated the genuine-
ness of their concern for this legally protected interest by the substan-
tial expense and effort they had undergone in instituting and main-
taining the suit to protect it.
80
The Federal District Court for the District of Colorado, also relying
on Scenic Hudson and United Church of Christ, granted standing to
the Sierra Club in Parker v. United States,87 another environmental ac-
tion. The plaintiffs, including the Sierra Club, requested a declaratory
judgment and an injunction to prevent a proposed sale by the United
States of timber from a national forest, 8 alleging that certain statu-
81. Id. at 1005.
82. Id. at 1002, 1006. Judge Burger, treating the viewing public as consumers,
analogized to cases in which the consuming public was granted standing to challenge
administrative actions. Id. at 1002.
83. 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
84. Id. at 100. The Sierra Club argued that the proposed construction was gov-
erned by the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, which requires Congressional approval
before the construction of "any bridge, dam, dike, or causeway over or in any ...
navigable water of the United States . . . ." 33 U.S.C. § 401 (1970).
85. 425 F.2d at 105.
86. Id. at 103.
87. 307 F. Supp. 685 (D. Colo. 1969), af'd, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971).
88. Id. at 686. Procedures required by the Multiple Use-Sustained Yield Act,
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tory procedures protecting the public's interest in the scenic and recre-
ational aspects of public lands had not been met. The court found the
plaintiffs to be proper parties to bring the action since they were "ad-
vancing the public interest" and had a "special interest in the values
which Congress sought to protect" by enacting the statutes in ques-
tion.89
The Sierra Club Court refused to follow the theory advanced by
some of these lower court decisions. Because the Sierra Club had al-
leged merely an organizational interest in the environmental prob-
lem in general, rather than a direct injury to itself or its members, the
Court refused to grant it standing to sue. 90 Justice Stewart, writing for
the majority, believed that cases like Citizens Committee for the Hud-
son Valley and the instant case, wherein plaintiffs relied on their con-
cern and expertise in the litigated matter rather than on an individual-
ized injury, reflected a misunderstanding of cases involving "public
actions" in the area of administrative law.0 1 This misunderstanding,
Justice Stewart believed, was founded initially upon an incorrect reading
of the Court's decision in SCripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC,02 wherein
the licensee of a Cincinnati, Ohio, radio station had sought a stay of an
order of the FCC allowing another radio station in a neighboring city to
change its frequency and increase its power. 3 The FCC opposed the
issuance of the stay order, claiming that the court of appeals lacked
the power to grant a stay at the behest of a competitor 4 because such
action was not provided for in the Communications Act of 1934."
The Supreme Court nevertheless held the court of appeals had the
requisite power:
The Communications Act of 1934 did not create new private rights.
The purpose of the Act was to protect the public interest in communi-
cations. By § 402(b)(2) Congress gave the right of appeal to per-
sons "aggrieved or whose interests are adversely affected" by Commis-
sion action. But these private litigants have standing only as repre-
sentatives of the public interest. That a court is called upon to enforce
public rights and not the interests of private property does not diminish
16 U.S.C. § 528 et seq. (1970), and the Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1131 et seq.
(1970), were alleged to have been violated.
89. 307 F. Supp. at 687.
90. 405 U.S. at 741.
91. Id. at 736.
92. 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
93. Id. at 4-5.
94. Id. at 5.
95. 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
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its power to protect such rights.0
The majority in Sierra Club, however, dismissed the italicized sentence
as dictum, 97 "since Scripps-Howard was clearly 'aggrieved' by reason of
the economic injury that it would suffer as a result of the Commis-
sion's action. 018  Justice Stewart believed that the Scripps-Howard
Court itself had recognized that standing to assert the rights of the
public is premised initially on a showing of personal injury sufficient
to confer standing to sue,99 as evidenced by the Scripps-Howard
Court's reliance on FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station.100
In Sanders a radio station, invoking the judicial review provisions
of the Communications Act of 1934,101 objected to the FCC's granting
of a permit for the erection of a rival station, alleging, inter alia, that
there was an insufficiency of advertising revenue to support an addi-
tional station.102 Thus the radio station's asserted basis for standing
was the competitive injury it would suffer by the licensing of another
radio station in its listening area. The Sanders Court held that section
402(b)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934,103 providing for re-
view of the Commission's actions by any person aggrieved by such ac-
tion, gave the station standing to appeal:
Congress had some purpose in enacting [the Act]. It may have been
of the opinion that one likely to be financially injured by the issue of a
license would be the only person having a sufficient interest to bring to
the attention of the appellate court errors of law in the action of the
Commission in granting the license. 104
The Sierra Club Court therefore concluded that Sanders and Scripps-
Howard taken together indicated that a person must allege direct per-
sonal injury to himself before he will be accorded standing to sue, but
that once he has properly invoked the court's jurisdiction he may as-
96. 316 U.S. at 14-15 (citations omitted and emphasis added).
97. 405 U.S. at 736.
98. Id. at 737.
99. Id. n.11.
100. 309 U.S. 470 (1940), cited in Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 316 U.S.
4, 14 (1942).
101. 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1970).
102. 309 U.S. at 471.
103. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 402(b) (2), 48 Stat. 1093 (1934), as
amended, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(6) (1970). Section 402(b) provided inter alia for an
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia by any
person aggrieved or whose interests were adversely affected by any decision of the
Commission granting or refusing an application for a license or permit. Id.
104. 309 U.S. at 477.
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sert the rights of the public which have allegedly been invaded by the
agency's action.
1°5
105. 405 U.S. at 737. This construction of Sanders and Scripps-Howard is not uni-
versally accepted. Professor Jaffe, in expounding his view of the two cases, said:
Judge Frank in the well-known Associated Industries case believed, correctly in my
opinion, that under Sanders as reinforced by Scripps-Howard it is not a necessary
element of the constitutional requirement of case or controversy that the plaintiff
have any interest. It is enough that the statute authorizes him to represent the
public interest as a "private Attorney General." We have seen that the common
law both in England and the United States permits any citizen to enforce public
rights. L. JAFFE, JuDicirA. CONTROL OF ADmN'ISTRATwVE AcnoN 517 (1965)
(footnote omitted).
Professor Jaffe is referring to the case of Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694
(2d-Cir.), vacated on suggestion of mnootness, 320 U.S. 707 (1943), wherein an indus-
try association was granted standing to protest a decision made by the Secretary of
the Interior purporting to increase minimum prices for bituminous coal. The court
said:
The Court, in the Sanders and Scripps-Howard cases, as we understand them,
construed the "person aggrieved" review provision as a constitutionally valid statute
authorizing a class of "persons aggrieved" to bring suit in a Court of Appeals to
prevent alleged unlawful official action in order to vindicate the public interest,
although no personal substantive interest of such persons had been or would be
invaded. Id. at 705 (footnote omitted).
It was in the Associated Industries case that Judge Frank coined the now famous
phrase, "private Attorney Generals." Id. at 704.
Justice Harlan apparently adopted the Jaffe position in his dissenting opinion in
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), where he maintained:
It does not, however, follow that suits brought by non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs are
excluded by the "case or controversy" clause of Article m of the Constitution
from the jurisdiction of the federal courts. This and other federal courts have re-
peatedly held that individual litigants, acting as private attorneys-general, may have
standing as "representatives of the public interest." Id. at 120.
The phrase "non-Hohfeldian plaintiffs" is Professor Jaffe's, adopted from W. HOHFELD,
FuNDAmENTAL LEGAL CONc PnoNs (1913). The Hohfeldian plaintiff advances the
personal and proprietary interests of the traditional plaintiff, while the non-Hoh-
feldian plaintiff asserts representative and public interests.
Justice Harlan went on to say that "certain of the cases may be explicable as in-
volving a personal, if remote, economic interest," 392 U.S. at 120, thereby implying
that the plaintiffs in the remaining cases advanced no private interest whatsoever. See
id. at 131.
Professor Davis has strongly criticized these statements by Justice Harlan and Pro-
fessor Jaffe, arguing that each of the cases relied upon involved a plaintiff with an
individual interest of his own. K. DAVIs, AnmwisTRAiTrm LAW TanATisE § 22.09-6
(Supp. 1970). Even Professor Davis, however, did not argue that "injury in fact" to
oneself is constitutionally required, although he and several other authorities have as-
sumed, perhaps due in part to Justice Douglas' introduction of the "injury in fact" test
immediately after his discussion of Article ir in Data Processing, that the test is
derived from the case or controversy requirement. Id. § 22.00-1, at 706; see Associa-
tion of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 164 (1970); id. at 167-68 (Brennan, J., con-
curring in the result and dissenting).
The Sierra Club Court itself, while disagreeing with the Jaffe-Harlan position on
statutory and policy grounds, seemingly supported their position insofar as constitu-
tional requirements are concerned:
Congress may not confer jurisdiction on Art. M federal courts to render advisory
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The Court seemed to feel that this very distinction had been incor-
porated in the Administrative Procedure Act. Having noted the lower
courts' trend toward broadening the type of injury that could be al-
leged in support of standing under the Administrative Procedure Act
and other statutes authorizing judicial review of federal agency ac-
tion, 0 Justice Stewart stated:
But broadening the categories of injury that may be alleged in sup-
port of standing is a different matter from abandoning the requirement
that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.'
07
opinions, or to entertain "friendly" suits, or to resolve "political questions," because
suits of this character are inconsistent with the judicial function under Art. III.
But where a dispute is otherwise justiciable, the question whether the litigant is a
"proper party to request an adjudication of a particular issue" is one within the
power of Congress to determine. 405 U.S. at 732 n.3 (citations omitted), quoting
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968).
This language standing alone could reasonably be interpreted as being related merely to
the question of standing to assert an issue once standing to sue has properly been in-
voked. However, each and every one of the authorities cited by the Court stands for
the proposition that the Constitution does not require a personal interest to be asserted
by the plaintiff. One of the citations was to the page containing the statement by
Justice Harlan quoted above. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 120 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). The others were: FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477
(1940); Associated Indus. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943); Berger,
Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J.
816, 837 et seq. (1969); Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-
Hohfeldian or Ideological Plaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968). Berger, who
shares the Jaffe-Harlan view, has said: "[Tlhe notion that the constitution demands
injury to a personal interest as a prerequisite to attacks on allegedly unconstitutional
action is historically unfounded." Berger, supra, at 840.
The Court, then, may be prepared to limit Data Processing's significance insofar
as the case or controversy requirement is concerned to the only statement in the case
which explicitly dealt with the issue, which merely noted that:
"[I]n terms of Article IT limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of
standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
judicial resolution." Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-52 (1970), quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101
(1968).
Cf. K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.00-4 (Supp. 1970). Justices Black-
mun, Brennan and Douglas clearly do not consider the injury in fact test to be part of
the case or controversy requirement, since they are willing to dispense with the test
when environmental values are at stake. See text accompanying notes 117-19, 123-24,
135-40 infra.
106. See, e.g., cases cited in note 4 supra.
107. 405 U.S. at 738. A unique personal interest is required of a plaintiff bringing
an environmental action under a public nuisance tort theory. In public nuisance actions
the courts have repeatedly held that a private individual has no cause of action for the
invasion of a public right unless his damage is distinguishable from that sustained by
other members of the general public. See, e.g., Dozier v. Troy Drive-In-Theatres, Inc.,
265 Ala. 93, 89 So. 2d 537 (1956); Taylor v. Barnes, 303 Ky. 562, 198 S.W.2d 297
(1946); Painter v. Gunderson, 123 Minn. 323, 143 N.W. 910 (1913); Alexander v.
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Thus, while recent cases have conferred standing upon organizations
demonstrating merely an organizational interest in the areas of the
environment or consumer protection, 10 8 the majority in Sierra Club,
basing its decision on statutory grounds alone, 0 9 was unwilling to do
so, believing that "a mere interest in a problem" was not in and of it-
self sufficient to render the organization "adversely affected or ag-
grieved" under the Administrative Procedure Act. 10 This refusal to
confer standing upon a party alleging only a "special interest," the ma-
jority declared, would not insulate executive action from judicial re-
view nor prevent the assertion of the public interest:"'
The test of injury in fact goes only to the question of standing to obtain
judicial review. Once this standing is established, the party may assert
the interest of the general public in support of his claims for equitable
relief."1
2
Since the Sierra Club had alleged only a "special interest" in environ-
mental protection, it had not satisfied the "injury in fact" requirement
Wilkes-Barre Anthracite Coal Co., 254 Pa. 1, 98 A. 794 (1916). In National Audubon
Soc'y v. Johnson, 317 F. Supp. 1330 (S.D. Tex. 1970), the plaintiff was unsuc-
cessful in utilizing a public nuisance suit to halt the dredging of certain bays where it
operated and maintained a wildlife sanctuary. The district court found that the
Society's injury was not peculiar to it, but was shared by the general public and those
whose land bordered on the bays. The court said:
In nuisance actions, courts have substantially narrowed the scope of protected in-
terests by requiring plaintiff to show that the nuisance has caused or will cause in-
jury peculiar to him. If the injury is to the general public and no individual sus-
tains special injury, only governmental entities will have standing to sue the pol-
luters. Id. at 1335, quoting Current Problems, Water Pollution Control in Texas,
48 TExAs L. REv. 1029, 1172 (1970).
108. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C.
Cir. 1970); Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971). In Izaak Walton League v. St. Clair,
313 F. Supp. 1312 (D. Minn. 1970), the court in granting standing to the League said:
The Izaak Walton League is not a "johnny-come-lately" or an ad hoc organization
and its interest in the wilderness movement is continuing, basic and deep. It
therefore has an "aesthetic, conservational and recreational" interest to protect.
This gives it standing. . . . Id. at 1317.
109. The Court observed:
Where . . . Congress has authorized public officials to perform certain functions
. . and has provided by statute for judicial review of those actions . . . the
inquiry as to standing must begin with a determination of whether the statute in
question authorizes review at the behest of the plaintiff. 405 U.S. at 732.
The general principle established in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 49
(1803), was that statutory grounds would be used to dispose of controversies where
possible, and constitutional issues considered only as a last resort.
110. 405 U.S. at 739.
111. Id. at 740.
112. Id. n.15.
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of Data Processing"13 and hence was not entitled to assert the public
interest.
113. Id. at 734-36. Finding that the Sierra Club had failed to meet this first require-
ment of Data Processing, the Court did not consider whether the Club had met the
"zone of interest" requirement also mentioned in that case. Id. at 733 n.5. See text
accompanying notes 60-66 supra.
There is some controversy over whether the "zone of interests" test is still necessary
to establish standing under the Administrative Procedure Act. Justice Brennan, with
whom Justice White joined, in a concurring and dissenting opinion for both Data
Processing and Barlow v. Collins, argued that the injury in fact test was the only one
necessary to determine standing. 397 U.S. 150, 168-69 (1970). According to
Brennan:
Before the plaintiff is allowed to argue the merits, it is true that a canvass of
relevant statutory materials must be made in cases challenging agency action.
But the canvass is made, not to determine standing but to determine an aspect of
reviewability, that is, whether Congress meant to deny or to allow judicial review
of the agency action at the instance of the plaintiff. Id. at 169 (footnote omitted).
Professor Davis agrees with the Brennan dissent, noting that the "law of
standing . . . has long been too complex" and that one good way of simplifying it
would be to use the injury in fact test alone to establish standing. K. DAvis, ADMiN-
ISTRATivE LAW TREATISE § 22.00, at 703 (Supp. 1970).
The appellate court in Sierra Club declined to apply the ione of interest test be-
cause "the significance of the language [regarding the test in Data Processing] is not
clear . . . [and] does not establish a test separate and apart from [injury in fact].
Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 31 (1970).
But see Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45, 46 (1970) (travel agent pro-
testing competition by a bank held to be arguably within the zone of interests of the
Bank Service Corporations Act).
Lower court decisions which have applied the zone of interest test include City of
Lafayette v. SEC, 454 F.2d 941, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1971), and Constructores Civiles de
Centroamerica v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1972), which noted:
Although the Supreme Court's requirement of injury to an interest "arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated" has been the subject of
much critical comment, and some . . . decisions indicate that injury in fact alone
may suffice to establishing standing, [this court notes] that under either standard
[plaintiff has standing]. Id.
It may be contended that the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970), has expanded the class of plaintiffs who are arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated under statute, according to the
two-pronged test established in Data Processing, to anyone with an interest in the en-
vironment. In Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238
(M.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd 454 F.2d 613 (3d Cir. 1971), the court held that the plaintiff
environmental groups and individuals were within the zone of interests to be protected
by NEPA, the Federal Aid Highway Act and the Department of Transportation Act
because all of these were designed to protect the environment. Id. at 244-45. In
Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 328 F. Supp. 332 (D.N.M. 1971), NEPA alone was
invoked as a statute protecting an interest in the environment. See also Natural
Resources Defense Council v. Grant, 341 F. Supp. 356, 368 (E.D.N.C. 1972) (in-
terest of national and local environmental groups in protecting a public stream held
to be within the zone of interests to be protected by NEPA).
NEPA did not become effective until January of 1970 (6 months after the Sierra
Club case was filed in the trial court) and it has not yet been invoked in the case, even
though there is authority that the Act applies to continuing projects commenced prior
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Justice Blackmun disagreed with the majority and would have en-
couraged the lower court decisions. While admitting that "[i]f this
were an ordinary case, I would join the opinion and the Court's judg-
ment and be quite content,"'1 4 Justice Blackmun seemed to give en-
vironmental litigation top priority:
[Tihis is not ordinary, run-of-the-mill litigation. The case poses-if
only we choose to acknowledge and reach them-significant aspects of
a wide, growing, and disturbing problem, that is, the Nation's and the
world's deteriorating environment with its resulting ecological disturb-
ances. Must our law be so rigid and our procedural concepts so in-
flexible that we render ourselves helpless when the existing methods
and the traditional concepts do not quite fit and do not prove to be
entirely adequate for new issues?" 5
Justice Blackmun would have conferred standing upon the Sierra Club
by either of two alternatives. The first would have required the
amending of the Club's complaint to meet the majority's standing re-
quirements." 6 The second would have entailed an expansion of the
traditional concepts of standing to confer standing to litigate environ-
mental issues upon organizations with well-recognized interests in the
area of environment. 1 7  Justice Blackmun maintained that his second
proposal was merely a slight liberalization of the law of standing to
sue, since the Court "need only recognize the interest of one who has a
provable, sincere, dedicated, and established status."' 8s
Justice Blackmum felt that a slight relaxation of standing require-
ments in environmental litigation was needed in order to assure the
to its effective date. Brooks v. Volpe, 460 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1972); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728, 743 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
114. 405 U.S. at 755.
115. Id. at 755-56. Justice Blackmun gives five reasons why the holding of the
majority in this particular case might prove catastrophic to the fate of the Mineral
King Area: (1) the court of appeals' reversal of the preliminary injunction will be
upheld since the Supreme Court never reached the merits; (2) interim relief by the
District Court is therefore now out of the question, and irreversible development of the
Mineral King area will result; (3) the Sierra Club may either choose not to amend its
complaint, or not be allowed to since this request for amendment would occur more
than 3 years after the filing of the original complaint; (4) the pressure to get the
project underway will mount; and (5) once underway, the momentum of such a gigantic
project will be extremely difficult to halt. Id. at 756. Justice Blackmun's willingness
to entertain suits alleging environmental injury is noteworthy when contrasted with
his reluctance to hear cases alleging constitutional violations. See Bivens v. Six Un-
known Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 430 (1971).
116. 405 U.S. at 756.
117. Id. at 757.
118. Id. at 757-58.
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adequate protection of public interests." 9 The majority of the Court
refused to allow such a relaxation, apparently out of fear that it would
encourage a plethora of frivolous environmental lawsuits. This fear is
evident in the following statment of the Court:
[I]f any group with a bona fide "special interest" could initiate such
litigation, it is difficult to perceive why any individual citizen with the
same bona fide special interest would not also be entitled to do so.
120
Justice Blackmun did not share this fear that "Pandora's box" would
be opened, but rather believed that the courts would exercise appro-
priate restraints as they have in the past. 2 1 Nor do various other au-
thorities subscribe to this fear.
122
Both Justice Douglas and Justice Brennan shared the views of Jus-
tice Blackmun.123  Justice Douglas, however, advanced an additional
basis for conferring standing to sue on the Sierra Club. Avoiding use
of the tests for standing which he himself had established in the Data
Processing and Barlow cases, Justice Douglas suggested the more
119. See id. at 755. Such a relaxation may soon be forthcoming in California. A bill
authorizing individuals to maintain environmental actions has been passed by the As-
sembly and currently awaits consideration by the Senate. A.B. 366, Cal. Legis., Regular
Sess. (1972), as amended through Jul. 28, 1972, would enact the California Conserva-
tion Act providing for specific legal and administrative proceedings to conserve and
protect the environment from destruction and pollution. A portion of the bill provides:
Any person may maintain an action for equitable relief against any person for the
protection of the natural resources of the state from pollution, impairment, or de-
struction. Id. § 536.11.
The word "person" is given an expansive definition:
As used in this chapter, "person" includes any person, firm, association, organiza-
tion, partnership, business trust, corporation, company, district, county, city and
county, city, town, the state, and any of the agencies and political subdivisions of
such entities. Id. § 536.5.
In effect, A.B. 366 gives the private individual standing to sue to protect the environ-
ment without requiring that he allege a unique private injury.
120. 405 U.S. at 739-40.
121. Id. at 758. Justice Blackmun did not elaborate on the form or content of
these restraints.
122. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968); Davis, The Liberalized
Law of Standing, 37 U. Cmu. L. REV. 450, 470-71 (1970); cf. K. DAvis, AnDmiSmhATv
LAW TREATIsE § 22.004, at 722, 724-25 (Supp. 1970). In Cape May County Chapter,
Inc., Izaak Walton League v. Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504 (D.NJ. 1971), the district
court summed up the problem as follows:
We do not share the fear of some earlier decisions that liberalized concepts of"standing to sue" will flood the Courts with litigation. However, if that should be
the price for the preservation and protection of our natural resources and environ-
ment against uncoordinated or irresponsible conduct, so be it. But such seems
most improbable. Courts can always control the obviously frivolous suitor. Id.
at 513.
123. 405 U.S. at 741, 755. Justice Brennan simply concurred in Justice Blackmun's
second alternative.
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imaginative approach of allowing standing to the "inanimate object
about to be despoiled, defaced, or invaded by roads and bulldozers.
" . .,1,4 This would lead to a treatment of the inanimate objects as
quasi-persons and to a conferral of standing upon them to sue for their
own preservation. 12 5 Justice Douglas analogized to cases in admiralty
which give standing to ships s and noted that corporations, whose
legal identity was once the subject of heated debate, are today given
standing as a matter of course.'1 7  He asserted that valleys, alpine
meadows, rivers, lakes, estuaries, beaches, ridges, groves of trees,
swampland, or even air should be treated similarly.' 28
If considered as persons, such natural objects would obviously pos-
sess the "personal interest" required by the majority. The litigant
representing the natural object, Justice Douglas reasoned, could be ap-
pointed much like guardians ad litem, executors, conservators, re-
ceivers, or counsel for indigents are presently appointed.1 9  Thus, the
natural object's inability to speak for itself would not impede the
124. Id. at 741, citing Stone, Should Trees Have Standing?-Toward Legal Rights
for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Stone].
125. John M. Naff, Jr., has written a poem based on Justice Douglas' proposal in
the A.B.A. Journal, 58 A.B.AJ. 820 (1972):
The Founding Fathers lacked the knowledge
Of ecology as taught in college.
If secretaries fail to heed
Demands of clubs asserting need
To save the world from degradation,
Let there be no deprivation.
We'll grant the right to litigate
To objects quite inanimate.
The stones against them will cry out
And get a judgment without doubt.
If courts below should tend to tarry
We'll slap them down on certiorari
'Til the day when every towering peak
Gets its First Amendment right to speak ....
Mr. Naff expressed some concern for the effects of such law in other parts of his poem:
We'll be sued by lakes and hills
Seeking a redress of ills.
Great mountain peaks of name prestigious
Will suddenly become litigious.
Our brooks will babble in the courts,
Seeking damages for torts.
How can I rest beneath a tree
If it may soon be suing me?
Or enjoy the playful porpoise
While it's seeking habeas corpus?
126. 405 U.S. at 742.
127. Id. at 742-43. Seemingly anticipating a reaction of astonishment, Justice
Douglas noted that early jurists thought of the corporation as a highly artificial entity,
but today suits on its behalf are very common. Id. at 743 n.4.
128. id. at 743.
129, Id. at 750 n.8,
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maintenance of an action for its protection.' 30
Justice Douglas would require, however, that the litigant represent-
ing the natural object have a meaningful relationship with it which
would enable him to speak for the values which it represents:131
Those who hike the Appalachian Trail ... and camp or sleep there,
or run the Allagash in Maine, or climb the Guadalupes in West Texas,
or who canoe and portage the Quetico Superior in Minnesota, cer-
tainly should have standing to defend those natural wonders before
courts or agencies, though they live 3,000 miles away. Those who
merely are caught up in environmental news or propaganda and flock
to defend these waters or areas may be treated differently. . . . [The]
inarticulate members of the ecological group cannot speak. But those
people who have so frequented the place as to know its values and
wonders will be able to speak for the entire ecological community.132
In thus attempting to narrow the category of permissible representa-
tives, Justice Douglas came suspiciously close to the "user" approach
adopted by the majority.' By restricting the class of persons who
may represent the inanimate objects to those who have visited the
area where these objects are situated, he in effect would allow suits to
be brought only by those plaintiffs whom the majority would consider
to be injured in fact.' One is thus led to wonder why Justice Douglas
entitled his separate opinion a dissent rather than a concurrence on dif-
ferent grounds.
The answer, perhaps, is that Justice Douglas' language says more
than it was meant to say. After all, he concurred in the views ex-
pressed by Justice Blackmun,' 35 who would "recognize the interest of
one who has a provable, sincere, dedicated, and established status"' 3
6
in the environmental area. Persons with such an interest could be
130. Professor Stone, who subscribes to this view, has said:
It is no answer to say that streams and forests cannot have standing because
streams and forests cannot speak. Corporations cannot speak either; nor can states,
estates, infants, incompetents, municipalities or universities. Lawyers speak for
them, as they customarily do for the ordinary citizen with legal problems. One
ought, I think, to handle the legal problems of natural objects as one does the prob-
lems of legal incompetents. . . . Stone, supra note 124, at 464.
131. 405 U.S. at 743.
132. Id. at 751-52.
133. See text accompanying notes 69, 73, 105-13 supra and note 162 infra.
134. Compare Justice Douglas' dissenting opinion in Scripps-Howard Radio, Inc. v.
FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942), where, in speaking of the appellant in that case, he said:
Unless he can show that his individual interest has been unlawfully invaded, there
is merely damnum absque injuria and no cause of action on the merits. Id. at 21
(citations omitted).
135. 405 U.S. at 741.
136. Id. at 757-58 (emphasis added).
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considered to "have that intimate relation with the inanimate object
about to be injured, polluted, or otherwise despoiled"'137 which Justice
Douglas would require in order for such persons to be legitimate
spokesmen. Justice Blackmun read Justice Douglas' opinion in such
a way:
[H]e makes only one addition to the customary criteria (the existence
of a genuine dispute; the assurance of adversariness; and a conviction
that the party whose standing is challenged will adequately represent
the interests he asserts), that is, that the litigant be one who speaks
knowingly for the environmental values he asserts. 138
That this interpretation of Justice Douglas' opinion is at least partially
correct is demonstrated by his willingness to accord standing to the
Sierra Club despite its refusal to allege any use of the area by either
itself or its members. He apparently agreed with the district court
that the Sierra Club's uncontested allegation that "[o]ne of the prin-
cipal purposes of the Sierra Club is to protect and conserve the na-
tional resources of the Sierra Nevada Mountains"'13 made the Club
"'sufficiently aggrieved' to have 'standing' to sue on behalf of Mineral
King [an area in the Sierra Nevada Mountains]."' 4 9
The most reasonable interpretation of Justice Douglas' opinion
would probably place it midway between the positions adopted by the
majority and by Justice Blackmun. Justice Douglas would allow liti-
gants who speak knowingly for the ecology of a specific area, such as
the Sierra Nevada Mountains, to represent any portion of that area
threatened with environmental harm, regardless of whether or not the
litigants were "users" of the particular portion being threatened; but
he would not allow the same litigants to represent other areas with
which they had no meaningful relationship, even if they had a sincere
and established status in the environmental area in general.
If the Sierra Club Court's treatment of the past cases and its con-
clusions from that treatment are considered to be reasonable, although
not unassailable,141 its opinion still leaves much to be desired. In a
time when our environment urgently needs protection, the Supreme
Court of the United States has overlooked an opportunity to approve
and encourage decisions of lower courts indicating a desire to give that
protection. Considering the Supreme Court's refusal to adopt the
137. Id. at 745.
138. Id. at 758.
139. Id. at 744.
140. Id.
141. See note 105 and text accompanying notes 74-105 supra.
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liberalizing trend of the lower courts, it is questionable whether the
Sierra Club can ever obtain standing when alleging only environmental
injury. It is difficult to perceive how the Sierra Club, as an organiza-
tion, can meet the majority's requirement of a direct injury in most
situations. For example, the club's only hope of acquiring standing to
sue in its own right in the instant case seems to hinge on the happen-
stance that it sponsors regular camping trips into the Mineral King
area.142  If the threatened injury were to an area where no organized
trips are sponsored, perhaps due to the Club's concern about over-use
of the area, no "direct" injury could be shown. In essence, the major-
ity justices would force an organization dedicated to preserving and en-
hancing our environment to actively encourage exploitation of that en-
vironment before they will accord it standing to sue on behalf of the
environment.
However, the Sierra Club majority hinted that the Club could obtain
standing through the rights of its members. In referring to the Wilder-
ness Society's assertion that the Sierra Club and its members continu-
ally use the Mineral King area,' 43 the majority said:
These allegations were not contained in the pleadings, nor were they
brought to the attention of the Court of Appeals. . . . Our decision
does not, of course, bar the Sierra Club from seeking in the District
Court to amend its complaint .... 144
This language suggests that the majority would have granted standing
if the Sierra Club had relied on the injury to its members in being
deprived of the right to continue using Mineral King in its wilderness
state. 4
5
142. 405 U.S. at 735-36 n.8; see note 71 supra.
143. See 405 U.S. at 735-36 n.8.
144. Id.
145. The recent case of Aberdeen & Rockfish Ry. v. Students Challenging Regula-
tory Agency Procedures (SCRAP), 93 S. Ct. 1 (Burger, Circuit Justice, 1972), holds
the possibility that the Supreme Court may have an opportunity to follow this theory
in the future. There, a student organization challenged orders of the Interstate Com-
merce Commission permitting and extending a surcharge on railroad rates on the
ground that the present rate structure discouraged the transporting of recyclable goods
and that any uniform increase would further discourage recycling. In the view of
the plaintiff, this would lead to increased environmental depredation due to dis-
carded recyclable goods and the unnecessary exploitation of natural resources. A
three-judge court rejected the Government's contention that the plaintiff lacked standing
under the Sierra Club decision, even though SCRAP was merely "'an unincorporated
association formed by five law students from the [George Washington University]
National Law Center . . . in September 1971' whose 'primary purpose is to enhance
the quality of the human environment for its members, and for all citizens . . .'
Id. at 2 n.1, quoting SCRAP'S complaint. The court accorded SCRAP standing
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Later in the opinion the majority cited NAACP v. Button140 and
said, "It is clear that an organization whose members are injured may
represent those members in a proceeding for judicial review."'1 47  The
Court's reliance on Button seems inapposite. First, the Button case
involved a "standing to assert" problem, but the Sierra Club Court
speaks of it in a "standing to sue" context. Secondly, in Button, the
NAACP was permitted to assert the rights of its members only after
a showing that it had rights of its own to protect. The NAACP chal-
lenged a Virginia statute making it an offense for any person or organ-
ization to solicit business for an attorney. The NAACP claimed the
statute contravened its right and the rights of its members and lawyers to
associate for the purpose of aiding persons seeking legal redress for viola-
tions of their constitutional rights. The Button Court said:
We think petitioner may assert this right on its own behalf, because,
though a corporation, it is directly engaged in those activities, claimed
to be constitutionally protected, which the statute would curtail ...
We also think petitioner has standing to assert the corresponding rights
of its members.14
8
While several courts have conferred standing upon an organization
invoking only the rights of its members, these courts have done so with
because it had alleged "that its members use the forests, streams, mountains, and
other resources in the Washington, [D.C.] area, for camping, hiking, fishing and sight-
seeing, and that this use [would be] disturbed by the adverse environmental impact
caused by nonuse of recyclable goods." Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Pro-
cedures (SCRAP) v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189, 195 (1972). The court then
granted the requested preliminary injunction and denied the Government's request for a
stay of the injunction pending appeal. Chief Justice Burger, as Circuit Justice for the
District of Columbia Circuit, "[rieluctantly" affirmed the denial of the stay, believing
"that the questions to be presented by this appeal 'are of such significance and diffi-
culty that there is a substantial prospect that they will command four votes for review'
when the full Court reconvenes for the October 1972 Term." 93 S. Ct. at 6, quoting
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 80 S. Ct. 33, 35 (Brennan, Circuit Justice, 1959).
146. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
147. 405 U.S. at 739.
148. 371 U.S. at 428 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has traditionally
held that a plaintiff cannot obtain standing by invoking only the rights of a third
party. See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149-54
(1951); Tileston v. Ulman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). The Court, however, has allowed
an organization with an interest of its own to assert the rights of its members when
those rights could not be asserted by the members themselves. See, e.g., Louisiana
ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v. City of Little Rock,
361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
The Court has followed a similar theory in allowing non-organizational plaintiffs to
assert the rights of third parties. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (doctor permitted to assert the rights of his patients); Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249 (1953) (caucasian allowed to assert the rights of non-caucasians).
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merely a perfunctory consideration of the accompanying problems and
prior case law. An exemplary decision is that of United Federation of
Postal Clerks, AFL-CIO v. Watson,14 9 wherein a union was accorded
standing to challenge a decision of the Postmaster General by relying
on the rights of its members. In granting the union standing the
court said:
The courts have come increasingly to recognize the standing of
associations to raise in some circumstances the rights of their members.
Where the principle of avoidance of constitutional issues is not involved,
the primary requisite for a grant of standing is an interest sufficient to
insure "that the questions will be framed with the necessary specificity,
that the issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that
the litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor . ... 150
In making this statement, however, the court cited the Button case for
support. The inappropriateness of this reliance on Button has been
previously manifested. The court continued:
Thus, we have allowed associations to assert their members' interests
when the "association is an authorized spokesman organized to promote
these interests for its individual members." In such cases, absent evi-
dence to the contrary, it is reasonable to assume that the representative
speaks effectively for his constituency. 151
Another case granting standing to an organization relying on its
members' rights is Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Simonson, 52
wherein a neighborhood association sought judicial review of the reis-
suance of a liquor license. The court granted standing and stated:
"Since the association is an authorized spokesman organized to pro-
mote these interests for its members, it too has standing to sue to pro-
tect their interests."' 53 The Citizens Association court, like the United
Federation of Postal Clerks court, relied on the Button case for sup-
port. However, in addition to Button, the Citizens Association court
relied on NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.'54 There, the
NAACP was allowed to assert the rights of its members, but only be-
cause the members were unable to bring suit without sacrificing the
149. 409 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 902 (1969).
150. Id. at 469-70, quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 106 (1968) (footnotes
omitted).
151. Id. at 470 (footnotes omitted), quoting Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Simon-
son, 403 F.2d 175, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969).
152. 403 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 975 (1969).
153. Id. at 176 (citations omitted).
154. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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very rights they sought to protect. It is therefore obvious that the
Alabama case lends no more support than does the Button case.
In Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp. 15 an individual plaintiff and
two consumer associations sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive
relief, and damages for the defendant's alleged false advertising. The
court denied standing to all the plaintiffs, but as to the organizational
plaintiffs said, "It is clear that an organization has standing to seek
equitable relief on behalf of its own members."' 50 In making this
statement the court cited, inter alia, the Citizens Association case.
None of the aforementioned cases, promulgating the proposition
that an organization can obtain standing through its members, are sup-
ported by the authority they cite. The cases also fail to consider the
"case or controversy" problem such a proposition raises. The Data
Processing opinion seems to indicate that the case or controversy re-
quirement is only satisfied by an allegation of "injury in fact" to the party
seeking judicial review.' 57 When an organization seeks judicial review
alleging only the injury to its members, it alleges "injury in fact" to a
third party and hence does not satisfy the case or controversy require-
ment. In the Sierra Club case the court of appeals intimated that it
would have accorded the Sierra Club standing if it had alleged sufficient
injury to its members. 158  However, when the court of appeals was later
actually confronted with such an allegation in Alameda Conservation
Association v. California,'59 it refused to confer standing upon the or-
ganization involved, saying:
Nor does the fact that the corporate purposes are akin to those of its
members make the corporation the authorized spokesman for the pur-
pose of asserting its members' constitutional rights. . . . If the Asso-
ciation here had a recreational operation which it conducted and which
the defendants interfered with, it could assert it; if its physical surround-
ings were made unattractive, this aesthetic infringement would create
standing; or if it operated a conservation program, an interference with
that operation would establish standing. The point is that the standing
155. 327 F. Supp. 17 (D.D.C. 1971).
156. Id. at 23.
157. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 152-54 (1970); see K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATvE LAw TREATISE § 22.00-1, at 706
(Supp. 1970). But see note 105 supra. It is interesting to note that injury in fact
to the Association itself, rather than to its individual members, was not discussed in
the Data Processing opinion. It is difficult to perceive how such injury in fact could
have existed.
158. 433 F.2d at 33.
159. 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971).
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necessary to assert as a litigant must be that of the litigant.160
In its apparent willingness to allow the Sierra Club to rely solely
upon the rights of its members for standing to sue, the Sierra Club
Court overlooked the concomitant "case or controversy" problem and
seemed to contradict its own requirement that "the party seeking re-
view be himself among the injured."'' Like the lower courts, the
Sierra Club Court failed to consider the problems such an approach
would create and cited authority which does not support its position.
The Court, in future cases, will apparently require that environ-
mental issues be litigated by a "user" of the area in question. This is
implied by the Court's statement that:
The Sierra Club failed to allege that it or its members would be af-
fected in any of their activities or pastimes by the Disney development.
Nowhere in the pleadings or affidavits did the Club state that its mem-
bers use Mineral King for any purpose .... 162
But is this requirement wise? Justice Blackmun apparently thinks
not, for he asserted:
[A]ny resident of the Mineral King area-the real "user"--is an
unlikely adversary for this Disney-governmental project. He naturally
will be inclined to regard the situation as one that should benefit him
economically. . . But that glow of anticipation will be short-lived
at best. If he is a true lover of the wilderness-which is likely, or he
would not be near Mineral King in the first place-it will not be long
before he yearns for the good old days when masses of people-that
14,000 influx per day-and their thus far uncontrollable waste were
unknown to Mineral King.' 63
Either Justice Blackmun's second alternative or Justice Douglas'
proposal would have been a better solution for the Court to adopt.
Both would require a detailed examination of the credentials of the
party seeking to represent the environment by the court in which a
suit is filed. Justice Blackmun would require that the party be an or-
ganization possessed of "well-recognized attributes and purposes in
the area of environment."'1 4  Justice Douglas would require that the
party speak knowingly for the ecology of the area being threatened. 6
160. Id. at 1091 (citation and footnote omitted); accord, L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL. CONTROL
or ADMINsTRATIvE ACTION 542-43 (1965).
161. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
162. 405 U.S. at 735 (emphasis added).
163. Id. at 759.
164. Id. at 757.
165. See text following note 140 supra.
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The proposal of Justice Douglas seems to neatly solve the environ-
mental standing problem, in that it does not alter the traditional re-
quirements, but merely permits a guardian to speak for an inanimate
object meeting those requirements. However, the suggestions of both
justices would make certain that only parties willing to vigorously as-
sert all possible arguments on behalf of the environment would be
chosen to represent it. The Sierra Club decision, a decision refusing to
join the progressive holdings of lower courts liberalizing the law of
standing,'66 is a step backward toward inaccessability of the courts in
resolving environmental problems, a step that is contrary in principle to
prior decisions of the Court.161
Brian C. Cuff
Teresa A. Clark
166. See, e.g., cases cited in note 4 supra.
167. See, e.g., Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367 (1962), where the Court held that only
upon a showing of "clear and convincing evidence" of a contrary legislative intent
should courts restrict access to judicial review. Id. at 379-80.
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